MODERN WEB APPLICATION DEFENSES AGAINST DANGEROUS NETWORK ATTACKS

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SecAppDev 2017



https://www.websec.be



@PhilippeDeRyck


SETUP OF THE HANDS-ON SESSION


- I have prepared a minimal amount of slides
 - Explain key concepts and new security policies
 - Just enough to make sure you know what you're doing during the hands-on part
- Hands-on part runs entirely within a VirtualBox VM
 - All software is pre-installed
 - We run our exercises on the SuperBug training application
- If you have any questions / remarks / discussions ... just call me over
 - Feel free to take the lab as far as you want to

ABOUT ME - PHILIPPE DE RYCK


- My goal is to help you build secure web applications
 - Hosted and customized in-house training
 - Specialized security assessments of critical systems
 - Threat landscape analysis and prioritization of security efforts
 - More information and resources on https://www.websec.be

- My security expertise is broad, with a focus on Web Security
 - PhD in client-side web security
 - Main author of the Primer on client-side web security






Why secure the communication channel?



SSL was introduced in 1995 by Netscape to secure online transactions

THANKS TO SNOWDEN, HTTPS IS FINALLY TAKEN SERIOUSLY



Google uses HTTPS as a ranking signal

Firefox warns about unsafe form submissions

Since November 2016, more than 50% of pages are visited over HTTPS

AWESOME SERVICES HELP IMPROVE HTTPS DEPLOYMENTS

Let's Encrypt is a **free**, **automated**, and **open**Certificate Authority.





https://letsencrypt.org/

COMMON THREATS TO THE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL



Eavesdropping on the network




COMMON THREATS TO THE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL

Impersonating a legitimate server



GETTING A CERTIFICATE FROM A CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY

Impersonating a legitimate server with a valid certificate



Moving from HTTP to HTTPS

How do you get mixed content situations?


- Embedding HTTP content in an HTTPS page is considered to be insecure
 - The HTTPS page is loaded over a secure channel, but the HTTP content is not
- This is common when you move from HTTP to HTTPS
 - Your own resources might still be loaded over HTTP
 - External content is often loaded over HTTP as well

When people ask why transitioning to HTTPS is so difficult, this is why: Sites like WIRED.com have a massive amount of data to process and understand.



https://help.salesforce.com/HTViewSolution?id=000005615&language=en_US https://www.wired.com/2016/05/wired-first-big-https-rollout-snag/

Why mixed content is considered to be a problem



Browsers finally following IE's lead

• Internet Explorer warned about mixed content since version 7

- Today, most desktop browsers block active and warn about passive mixed content
- Mobile browses were a bit slower, but have caught up by now

```
A Mixed Content: The page at 'https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/' was loaded over (index):1
HTTPS, but requested an insecure image 'http://example.org/insecure.png'. This content
should also be served over HTTPS.
```

Two explicit types of mixed content

- Passive mixed content does not interact with the page (images, audio, video)
- Active mixed content has the capability of interacting with the page


SO HOW DID OTHERS DEAL WITH MIXED CONTENT?

HOW WIRED COMPLETELY ENCRYPTED ITSELF

The Guardian has moved to HTTPS

Discover why and how the Guardian has moved to HTTPS, the secure version of the web protocol that helps to protect user privacy

- Use CSP to detect HTTP content
 - Detect HTTP resources up front
 - Update them before switching
- Gradually move to HTTPS
 - Carefully monitor the process
 - Adapt where necessary



https://www.wired.com/2016/09/wired-completely-encrypted/ https://www.theguardian.com/info/developer-blog/2016/nov/29/the-guardian-has-moved-to-https

DETECTING MIXED CONTENT WITH CONTENT SECURITY POLICY

- Content Security Policy (CSP) allows you to restrict content on a page
 - Whitelists define where content can be loaded from, everything else is blocked
 - You can instruct the browser to send a report about a violation
 - In report-only mode, the browser will send a report but will not block content

```
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only:

default-src https: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval';
report-uri https://yoursite.report-uri.io/default/csp/reportOnly
```

- A report-only CSP policy is ideal to find mixed content on your pages
 - Reports will contain information about the violation
 - You can track these, and fix them before even moving to HTTPS


DETECTING MIXED CONTENT WITH CONTENT SECURITY POLICY

Document URI	"http://localhost:8080/ViewCSPReports"
Blocked URI	"http://ajax.googleapis.com"
Referrer	"http://localhost:8080/Home"
Violated Directive	"default-src https: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'"
Effective Directive	
Original Policy	"default-src https: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; report-uri https://localhost:8443/cspreport


AUTOMATICALLY UPGRADING INSECURE REQUESTS

- Modern browsers can automatically translate HTTP to HTTPS
 - Can be controlled by the upgrade-insecure-requests CSP directive
 - Once enabled, all HTTP resources on the page will be loaded over HTTPS
 - Links within the same domain will be treated as HTTPS too
- This mechanism is intended to make the move to HTTPS easier
 - It's not always feasible to update legacy content to avoid mixed content problems
 - It's not a silver bullet, just a tool that makes it possible to secure legacy content
 - Only useful if you are sure that all included HTTP resources are available over HTTPS
- Compatible browsers announce support for the upgrade mechanism
 - When supported, you can redirect to HTTPS and upgrade insecure requests

AUTOMATICALLY UPGRADING INSECURE REQUESTS



AUTOMATICALLY UPGRADING INSECURE REQUESTS



BROWSER SUPPORT FOR UPGRADE-INSECURE-REQUESTS



BLOCKING MIXED CONTENT ONCE AND FOR ALL

- CSP helps you prevent mixed content once your transition is complete
 - The block-all-mixed-content directive prevents the loading of HTTP content
 - Applies to everything, including passive mixed content

Content-Security-Policy: block-all-mixed-content

- This is called strict mode for mixed content
 - Prevents the user from potentially overriding this setting
 - Avoids any UI indicator that mixed content is being blocked
 - Also applies to nested browsing contexts

BEST PRACTICES

- Do not underestimate the move to HTTPS
 - Start by reading up on potential problems from experience reports
 - The move to HTTPS not only impacts your content, but also your SEO
 - Use CSP to detect mixed content problems before making the transition
- Gradually tackle the transition to HTTPS and learn as you go
 - Start loading external content over HTTPS before making the move yourself
 - Update all references to http:// with https:// or the relative //
 - If your user base does not use IE, use the upgrade-insecure-requests directive
- Blocking mixed content can be useful to avoid future mixed content problems
 - Only use block-all-mixed-content when all resources are loaded over HTTPS



PROS / CONS OF THE LATEST HTTPS SECURITY POLICIES

HTTP WEAKENS HTTPS SITES

95% of HTTPS servers vulnerable to trivial MITM attacks


It would be extremely difficult for the attacker to obtain a valid certificate for a domain he does not control, and using an invalid certificate would cause the victim's browser to display an appropriate warning message. Consequently, man-in-themiddle attacks against HTTPS services are hard to pull off, and often not very successful. However, there are plenty of realistic opportunities to use the unencrypted HTTP protocol to attack most HTTPS websites.

Encrypted communications are an essential requirement for banks and other financial websites, but HTTPS alone is not sufficient to defend these sites against man-in-the-middle attacks. Astonishingly, many banking websites lurk amongst the 95% of HTTPS servers that lack a simple feature that renders them still vulnerable to pharming and man-in-the-middle attacks. This missing feature is HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), and only 1 in 20 secure servers currently make use of it, even though it is supported by practically all modern browsers.




SSL Stripping exploits the HTTP to HTTPS redirect

www.websec.be








STRICT TRANSPORT SECURITY AGAINST SSL STRIPPING

Strict Transport Security converts all HTTP requests to HTTPS



- Modern browsers support HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
 - HTTP response header to enable Strict Transport Security
 - When enabled, the browser will not send an HTTP request anymore

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From version	4	4	7	11	4.4.4	7.1

HSTS can be enabled with a simple one-liner


- The policy is controlled by the Strict-Transport-Security header
 - max-age specifies how long the policy should be enforced in seconds
 - Make sure this is long enough to cover two subsequent visits
 - If necessary, the policy can be disabled by setting max-age to 0

```
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
```


- The policy can be extended to automatically include subdomains
 - This behavior is controlled by the includeSubDomains flag
 - Before enabling this, carefully analyze the services you are running on your domain

```
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
```

BUT HOW DO YOU MAKE THE FIRST CONNECTION OVER HTTPS?



Preloading HSTS into the browser




Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload

https://hstspreload.appspot.com/?

BEST PRACTICES FOR DEPLOYING HSTS

- Correctly configure HSTS on your domain
 - Attach the HSTS header to every response from the domain
 - Set the max-age to a sensible value, long enough to cover two subsequent visits
- Works towards preloading
 - Only include the preload flag once you're applying to be put on the list
- In case you're afraid of breaking things, deploy HSTS conservatively
 - Never set the max-age longer than the expiration date of the certificate
 - Decrease the max-age over time, until a new certificate is installed
 - Enable HSTS on subdomains first, before switching on includeSubDomains























Aleene 🛅 مشيشة تقليه و كاطبرون 🚳 مغرونگاه بين اعتبر شه





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
OK.

HTTP PUBLIC-KEY PINNING (HPKP)

- HPKP is a server-driven, browser-enforced security policy
 - Instructs the browser to only accept a pinned public key
 - Intended to be used in combination with HSTS
- Pins associate a hostname with a cryptographic identity
 - Can be on certificate level, CA level, ...
 - Trade-off between specificity and resilience

```
Public-Key-Pins: max-age=3000;
pin-sha256="d6qzRu9zOECb90Uez27xWltNsj0e1Md7GkYYkVoZWmM=";
pin-sha256="E9CZ9INDbd+2eRQozYqqbQ2yXLVKB9+xcprMF+44U1g="
```

HTTP PUBLIC-KEY PINNING (HPKP)



HPKP IN PRACTICE



- HPKP has the potential to make sites unreachable
 - A mismatch between the key and the stored pin results in errors
 - New pins can only be set after the old pins are validated
- Precautions taken by the browsers
 - At least two pins are required to enable HPKP
 - Max-age is handled carefully (e.g. to allow gradual key migration)
- Operators should have a pinned but unused backup key

HPKP OFFERS A REPORTING MODE


```
"date-time": "2014-04-06T13:00:50Z",
"hostname": "www.example.com",
"port": 443,
"effective-expiration-date": "2014-05-01T12:40:50Z"
"include-subdomains": false,
"served-certificate-chain": [
  "----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----\n
 MIIEBDCCAuygAwIBAgIDAjppMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVT\n
 HFa911F7b1cq26KqltyMdMKVvvBulRP/F/A8rLIQjcxz++iPAsbw+zOzlTvjwsto\n
 WHPbqCRiOwY1nQ2pM714A5AuTHhdUDqB1O6qyHA43LL5Z/qHQF1hwFGPa4NrzQU6\n
 yuGnBXj8ytqU0CwIPX4WecigUCAkVDNx\n
 ----END CERTIFICATE----",
"validated-certificate-chain":
  "----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----\n
 MIIEBDCCAuygAwIBAgIDAjppMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVT\n
  ...
 HFa911F7b1cq26KqltyMdMKVvvBulRP/F/A8rLIQjcxz++iPAsbw+zOzlTvjwsto\n
 WHPbqCRiOwYlnQ2pM714A5AuTHhdUDqB106qyHA43LL5Z/qHQF1hwFGPa4NrzQU6\n
 yuGnBXj8ytqU0CwIPX4WecigUCAkVDNx\n
 ----END CERTIFICATE----",
  ...
"known-pins": [
  'pin-sha256="d6qzRu9z0ECb90Uez27xWltNsj0elMd7GkYYkVoZWmM="',
  "pin-sha256=\"E9CZ9INDbd+2eRQozYgqbQ2yXLVKB9+xcprMF+44U1g=\""
```

HPKP OFFERS A REPORTING MODE

- HPKP also supports a report-only mode
 - The pins will be checked, but the connection will not be blocked
 - Report will be sent to the end point
 - Great for testing your policy before breaking your entire website

- The header allows the specification of a reporting endpoint
 - When the browser detects a violation, it will send a report
 - Great for actively detecting problems
 - Do not send reports to your pinned domain, should it become blocked ...
- Report-uri.io is a freely available service to collect your reports

WHAT CAN GO WRONG WITH HPKP?



DEALING WITH HOSTILE PINNING

Has been coined as HPKP Suicide or RansomPKP

- Concerns scenarios where your server is compromised
- Pins are served to your users, and this cannot be easily undone

Hostile pinning is a difficult problem to solve

- Spec suggests that browsers limit the duration of max-age
- Use complementary solutions like Certificate Transparency

Browsers have a minimal preload list

- Contains large and important sites (Google, Mozilla, Twitter, ...)
- Adding your own sites does not seem to be possible
 - The update process is quite slow too, which is suboptimal for key pins

BEST PRACTICES FOR DEPLOYING HSTS

- Enable in report-only mode to gain insights into attacks
 - Detect rogue keys in use
 - Get insights into the behavior of middleboxes

- Read about the problems that arise when enabling blocking mode
 - Map out all the scenarios up front
 - Start with a small max-age
 - Keep your key material in a safe place, even after your certs have expired



Now it's up to you ...







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April 24 – 25, Leuven, Belgium

https://essentials.websec.be



